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ABSTRACT  
This paper examines the diversity of corporate philanthropic practices and aims to determine 
whether corporations are strategic in their philanthropic giving. Using an original database 
including firm-level data on dollar donations for charitable purposes among American Fortune 
500 companies, this paper looks at the kind of firms that participate in giving, the kind of giving 
programs these firms set up, and the structure of the foundation giving these firms chose. The 
definition and identification of strategic philanthropy is discussed and explored. The main 
empirical findings of this paper provide evidence that at present time firms continue practicing 
non-strategic philanthropy. 
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INTRODUCTION  
In 2006, Giving USA estimated overall corporate contributions in the US, including both 
foundation and direct corporate giving, at $12.72 billion1. Total corporate giving has been on the 
rise since 1990 and almost doubled in the last 20 years. As of 2006, the share of companies’ pre-
tax profits devoted to corporate giving has been just under 1 percent2. Still, little is known about 
how exactly corporate giving programs spend their money and whether any of this money is 
being spent strategically3.  
“Strategic philanthropy” is a relatively new concept that has become popular with the 
publication of Porter and Kramer (2002) article. Unlike previous theoretical ideas that have 
mainly discussed if corporate philanthropy is beneficial for a company or if companies should 
practice philanthropy in the first place, Porter and Kramer (2002) have asserted that corporate 
philanthropy can not only be superior to individual foundations’, non-profit organizations’, and 
government work in solving societal issues but also can bring tangible financial value to 
((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
1 Giving USA estimated overall corporate contributions in the US in 2006, including both foundation and direct 
corporate giving, at $12.72 billion.  Estimated giving by corporate foundation was $4.2 billion (about 30% of total 
giving). The $2.7 billion of direct giving was in in-kind medication giving by operating foundations established by 
pharmaceutical manufacturers. Thus, there were around $5.8 billion in direct giving, excluding medication giving. 
/(Source: Foundation Director Online “Key Facts on Corporate Foundations”, April 2008.  
3 Corporate philanthropy is truly strategic only when corporate expenditures produce simultaneous social and 
economic gains and where corporate philanthropy and shareholder interests converge (Porter and Kramer, 2002). 
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companies4. Although the authors have not developed any formal theoretical model, some 
empirically testable hypotheses can be inferred from their work.  
In this paper, I look at the current corporate philanthropic practices and make a first step 
in empirically identifying strategic corporate philanthropy by testing the inferred hypotheses. I 
examine firm characteristics that choose to establish a giving program, choose to segregate 
giving into a separate entity (i.e., a foundation), choose to commit significant amounts of money 
to their giving program and finally choose to give significant fraction of their pretax earnings for 
charitable purposes. These hypotheses combined provide an indication of whether companies are 
pursuing philanthropy in the way that benefits the society.  
 The results indicate that corporations are not engaged in practicing philanthropy 
strategically. The firms with strong management are more likely to have foundations and giving 
programs, but at the same time are less likely to set aside significant amounts of money to pursue 
((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
4 In 2002, Porter and Kramer have published an article outlining some characteristics of the strategic philanthropy. 
The authors say that corporations can “practice and implement strategic corporate philanthropy by bringing 
corporate social and economic goals into alignment and in turn improving a company’s long-term business 
prospects. These companies [can] leverage their capabilities and relationship in support of charitable causes 
producing social benefits far exceeding those provided by individual donors, foundations, or even governments. 
These companies [can] provide strategic philanthropy by organizing education, safety, health, and decent housing 
for their employees by improving the long-term demand for their services and training the talent needed to provide 
these services and by building the infrastructure required to expand their markets. Strategic givers [can] achieve 
their goals by creating strategic partnerships with nonprofit institutions and governments and by utilizing nonprofit 
infrastructure and complementing it with the company’s internal knowledge. Strategic givers [can] work closely 
with local nonprofits over extended periods of time to achieve meaningful improvements to the organizations”. 
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long-term strategic philanthropic objectives. Also, the bigger givers are firms that also spend 
significant dollar amount on advertising, most likely implying that the corporate philanthropy 
these firms practice is closer in nature to public relations.  
The paper proceeds as follows: Its first section provides an overview of the theoretical 
and empirical literature concerning corporate philanthropy. The second section discusses testable 
hypotheses. Section 3 reviews the data source, the data set properties, and discusses the firm 
characteristics that are used as control variables, while Section 4 investigates, presents, and 
discusses empirical results. I conclude with limitations of this empirical work.    
SECTION 1: LITERATURE OVERVIEW    
Most of the previous theoretical and empirical studies have sought to understand if 
companies should practice philanthropy in the first place and the importance of the corporate 
philanthropy to firm value (Smith, 1994). One strand of literature views corporate charitable 
giving as a transparent conflict of interest between the shareholders and the manager of a 
company. Some scholars argue that shareholders are likely to have a low, or perhaps an 
indifferent, propensity for charitable giving (Friedman, 1970; Ullman, 1985). Shareholders are 
less likely than managers to approve of corporate charitable giving because the funding is 
ultimately coming out of their own pockets (Wang and Coffey, 1992). As investors, they are 
likely to perceive little tangible short-term or even long-term utility in dollars spent to improve 
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social conditions. In another strand of literature, researchers show that firms engage in corporate 
giving to preempt the introduction of new government regulations; to avoid environmental 
scandals, consumer boycotts, or law suits (Friedman, 1985, 1999); to differential their products 
(Bjorner et al, 2004); to improve employee productivity; to lower the cost of capital 
(e.g.,Mattingly and Berman, 2006). Some studies conclude that corporations directly substitute 
corporate contributions for more traditional advertisements (Navarro, 1998). Sharfman concludes 
that companies donate money to charitable causes to reduce tax burdens and to increase their 
reputations in their communities and among various stakeholder groups (1994). Parket and 
Eibert (1975) and McGuire et al. (1988) deduce that companies benefit from charitable giving 
through increased employee morale and improved reputation. Devis et al. (1997) suggest that 
CEOs act in the best interest of the company and argue that greater CEO discretion is likely to 
benefit the company even under issues of potential conflicting interest.  
 My contribution to the previous literature is twofold. First, I use a unique data set on 
corporate charitable giving, including companies that choose not to give. Observing companies 
that choose not to give allows me to assess whether companies that are engaged in giving are 
different than those that are not. Consistent with the previous literature, I continue investigating 
the determinants of corporate philanthropy. I allow for the possibility of companies providing 
corporate giving to satisfy personal interests of individual managers or board member, and thus 
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lead to agency cost. Second, I control for companies conducting corporate philanthropy that has 
little strategic content or long-term value (e.g., transaction-based giving, public relations, 
advertising).  
SECTION 2: HYPOTHESES 
 The following section discusses four hypotheses to be tested in the empirical section of 
this paper. To test a general story of whether the current practice of corporate philanthropy is 
strategic, these hypotheses are to be viewed not individually but in combination. Strong 
management is an indicator of whether a practice is favored by corporations with strong 
management.  Alternative interpretations will be discussed along the way.  
2.1. Participation in Giving  
 The first piece of information that will be tested is whether there is a difference between 
corporations that select to give versus not. In other words, I will be comparing firms with a 
giving program and a foundation to those without any kind of giving program. This will allow us 
to assess whether the two kinds of firms are different on any major observable characteristics, 
and especially strong management. If firms with strong management select to give, then giving is 
viewed as beneficial for a company.  
 It is important to note that a small fraction of firms in Fortune 500 set has no giving 
program of any kind (only 15%). The following general model will be tested. Because the 
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dependent variable is binary, I will estimate the coefficients with a Probit model, reporting 
marginal effects for each parameter.  
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assumes that a completely independent charitable foundation segregates giving from the business 
and forgoes opportunities to create greater value for society and the firm itself. Alternatively, 
having an integrated foundation and giving programs allows a corporation to identify and 
implement a corporate giving strategy focused on improving long-term company benefits. (
! 
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2.3. Establishing Endowments  
 Porter and Kramer hypothesize that “the most successful programs will not be short-term 
campaigns but long-term commitments that continue to grow in scale” (2002). One possible way 
to measure long-term commitment of a company is by checking whether a company-sponsored 
foundation is setting aside significant dollar amounts for its foundation as a way to ensure 
uninterrupted sponsorship of its strategic sponsorship charities. Alternative activity is a 
( V(
transaction-based giving, when a corporate foundation spends all the money it receives from a 
host corporation in a given year.  
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2.4. Dollar Giving 
 Combined with the previous hypotheses, larger percentage of pre-tax earning devoted to 
giving indicates a stronger commitment to charitable purposes. This hypothesis assumes that the 
quantity of charitable dollars is equivalent to the quality of dollars spent, which should not 
necessarily be true. If one corporation spends its money strategically, it can spend less and 
achieve greater results. Nonetheless, combined with hypotheses 1-3 this piece of information is 
helpful in determining whether the current practice of corporate philanthropy among firms with 
strong management is strategic.  
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SECTION 3: CORPORATE GIVING DATA  
3.1. Corporate Charitable Data  
 The corporation sample consists of 2006 Fortune 500 companies5. I exclude private and 
mutual companies because they do not have a stock exchange symbol (20 companies or 4% of 
companies excluded). The information on company-sponsored foundations and corporate giving 
programs6 is collected from Foundation Directory Online7. The online directory contains 
information on all company-sponsored foundations as well as some corporate giving programs8. 
The information on foundation giving is compiled from IRS information returns (Forms 990 and 
((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
5 http://www.aggdata.com/business/fortune_500 
6 The difference between a company-sponsored foundation and a corporate direct giving program is outlined below. 
Company-Sponsored Foundations a) are separate legal entities, that maintain close ties with and promote interests of 
the parent company in their giving; b) generally maintain small endowments and rely on regular contributions from 
the parent company and/or subsidiaries to support their giving programs; c) often grow their endowments in 
profitable years and tap them in leaner years; d) must follow the appropriate regulations governing private 
foundations. Such regulations require companies to file an annual Form 990-PF with the IRS. Corporate Direct 
Giving Programs a) are not separately incorporated and do not adhere to private foundation laws or regulations or 
file a Form 990-PF; b) enable the corporation to deduct up to ten percent of its pre-tax income for direct charitable 
contributions (this includes giving to the company’s foundation), while the average corporate contribution is closer 
to one percent; c) make other kinds of donations, sometimes treated as business expenses, which are not necessarily 
included in giving statistics; d) are often used by the company to supplement its support programs that do not fall 
under the guidelines of the company-sponsored foundation; e) do not have an endowment; f) frequently include 
employees’ matching gifts and in-kind gifts as part of their grant-making activities.(
7 http://foundationcenter.org 
8 Some corporations also make in-kind contributions (complimentary use of corporate facilities, donations of 
products, services, employee voluntarism), but given the ambiguity and inconsistencies in how firms value these 
contributions, we do not include non-cash items in the measure of giving. 
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990-PF9), grant-maker web sites, and annual reports. Using an option of “Trend Tracker” in the 
Foundation Directory Online, I extract two variables for corporate foundations: foundation assets 
(Line I of 990-PF form and Line 21 of 990 form) and foundation giving (Line 25 of 990-PF form 
and Line 22a of 990 form)10. For firms with corporation giving program, I extract giving for a 
particular year, if the information is available. Since companies are not required to report giving 
activities, only 33 percent of companies with a giving program, report their giving program 
amounts. In the following analysis, I will utilize all information available on giving program 
dollar amounts and indicate when a lack of information on giving program dollar donations leads 
to a loss in sample size.  
 Table 1 reports summary statistics of the firms’ chosen giving program. Fifteen percent 
of the sample report no giving program, 39 percent have only foundation, 25 percent have only 
giving program, and 20 percent have both giving and foundation programs. Seventy-six percent 
of the largest Fortune 500 companies have a charitable foundation, while only 47 percent of the 
fifth hundred have one. 
!
!
((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
9 The IRS requires that every private foundation file a Form 990-PF each year. IRS returns provide detailed financial 
data, a complete list of grants awarded, the names of the foundation's trustees and officers, and other information on 
the foundation.  
10 The details of 990-PF are available at http://foundationcenter.org/findfunders/990pffly.pdf.  
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 Foundations (%) Giving (%) Foundation & 
Giving (%) 
None (%) 
All Companies 39% 26% 20% 15% 
By Firm Ranking/Size     
0 - 100 43% 20% 33% 4% 
100 - 200 40% 23% 24% 13% 
200 - 300 38% 34%  15% 12% 
300 - 400 38% 24% 15% 22% 
400 - 500 35% 27% 12% 26% 
By selected industries*     
Services (N=16) 25% 25% 50% - 
Finance (N=62) 42% 29% 16% 13% 
Retail (N=53) 25% 23%  40% 13% 
Transportation (N=69) 37% 17% 30% 15% 
Manufacturing (N=169) 46% 21% 23% 10% 
All Firms     
$/Million of Sales 948 
 (4,845) 
149  
(344) 
509  
(473) 
 
$/Million of Assets 522  
(1,550) 
120  
(361) 
334  
(281) 
 
W":,-(PCC(/005(X"#:K&,(400(@"<+*&%,;(*#,(%&@CK=,=L(,F@,+:(/0(@"<+*&%,;(:8*:(*#,(<K:K*CCG("7&,=L(;K9;%=%*#%,;(*&=(
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The fraction of companies with both foundation and giving program decreases from 33 to 
12 percent between Fortune 100 and Fortune 400-500. Twenty six percent (26%) of companies 
in the fifth hundred of Fortune 500 have no giving program of any kind (compared with only 4 
percent of the first hundred). There is a strong association between the size of the company and 
its choice program. The lower part of the table examines the distribution of choice of giving 
( 12(
program by selected industries. The companies in similar industries tend to choose similar kinds 
of giving programs. Service and Retail have most of giving through a joint foundation and giving 
programs (50 percent and 40 percent, respectively), while Transportation, Manufacturing and 
Financing concentrate their giving through foundation (42 percent, 37 percent, and 46 percent, 
respectively). Interestingly, companies with Foundation only give much more than companies 
with Foundation & Giving Programs or companies with Giving Programs only (compare $948 to 
$509 and $149 per million of sales).  
Porter and Kramer hypothesize that “the most successful programs will not be short-term 
campaigns but long-term commitments that continue to grow in scale” (2002). Fifty percent of 
companies with foundations have assets of their foundations triple the current year’s giving 
amount, and 25 percent of companies have foundation assets exceeding giving by a factor of 
eight. Out of 500 companies, only about 60 have a foundation with significant assets that may be 
used for planned long-term programs. Companies in retail and service industries are less likely to 
have endowments, probably due to the volatility of the cash flows. The probability of a company 
having an endowment seems to be uncorrelated with firms’ size. “Endowments” may be industry 
specific. For example, in financial industries they may have a tendency to have foundations for 
tax exempt investment.  
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3.2. Control Variables  
 Two sets of control variables are used in the analysis: firm characteristics and strong 
management indicators.  
3.2.1. Firm Characteristics 
I extract companies’ annual income statements, balance sheets, and cash flow statement 
variables from the research data-base Compustat11. I control for firm profitability, size, market 
power, and leverage. To control for a firm’s profitability, I use Market-to-Book ratio. More 
profitable companies are likely to be willing to give more away for corporate social 
responsibility purposes. The assets and the number of employees of the company are good 
proxies for company size. The analysis uses a logarithm of the company’s assets and a logarithm 
of its number of employees. Larger companies are likely to give more both because they may 
have more market power and thus extract more economic rents and because they may have more 
issues to tend to and more regulations to preempt. Debt-to-equity reduces free cash flow and 
limits a manager’s ability to spend money. Thus, companies with higher debt are less likely to 
give to charities. Jensen argues that debt acts as a check on managerial discretion by enabling 
managers to effectively bond their promise to pay out future cash flows (1986). In the context of 
this study, I expect higher debt-to-value ratios to be associated with less charitable giving. I 
((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
11 Produced by Standard & Poor's Institutional Market Services. 
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expect positive correlation between R&D spending and giving. Public display of charity is a 
form of advertising and likely to be driven by the same underlying considerations. The potential 
targets of the advertising may be customers, employees, suppliers, and policymakers. This 
argument may mostly apply to firms with intangible assets. I also include two-digit SIC codes to 
control for potential differential industry effect (Alchian and Demsetx, 1972 and Alchian and 
Kessel, 1962). Companies in the same industry may pursue similar giving practices. 
3.2.2. Strong Management   
Strong management controls include CEO variable compensation, board of directors 
composition, and outside stakeholders ownership. A CEO’s compensation is very responsive to 
company performance (Hall and Liebman, 1998) and CEOs with higher variable component in 
their compensation are much better managers. Several studies examine the relationship between 
corporate giving and board composition. Consistent with the agency theory that oversight of the 
CEO by the board of directors is typically viewed as an effective means to mitigate agency 
problems (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), Coffey and Wang find that increasing the number of 
corporate outsiders on the board serves to minimize the amount of corporate charitable activity 
(1998). I use the percent equity held by block-holders (i.e., those shareholders who own 5% or 
more of the firm) to control for more effective shareholder monitoring. Block-holders are more 
likely to involve themselves directly in oversight and to seek redress for perceived abuses. 
( 15(
 The controls for corporate philanthropic laws are not included for a couple of reason. All 
states have philanthropy statutes that validate corporate authority to make contributions. Also, 
Brown et al, find that state philanthropic laws have no correlation with corporate philanthropic 
behavior (2006). Table 2 provides summary statistic of the control variables.  
"#$%&!7(!@<55#4A!@;#;,?;,-?!
  All Foundations Foundation & Giving Giving 
Firm Characteristics     
Assets (M) 53,544 60,294 107,874 24,001 
 (169,491) (184,483) (261,846) (51,868) 
Debt/Common Equity 97.98% 102.59% 106.84% 94.55% 
 (192.81%) (233.44%) (205.08%) (160.91%) 
Advertising/Sales 1.14% 0.86% 1.45% 1.49% 
 (2.62%) (1.98%) (2.75%) (3.38%) 
R&D/Sales 1.72% 2.28% 1.94% 1.26% 
 (5.04%) (6.54%) (4.57%) (3.84%) 
Market-to-Book 3.46 3.87 3.27 3.44 
 (6.19) (8.96) (2.49) (4.24) 
Employees (1,000) 56.35 66.41 69.58 47.22 
 (115.25) (163.85) (82.47) (65.26) 
Company Age 55.04 56.31 69.14 47.53 
 (45.98) (44.52) (53.69) (38.68) 
Strong Management     
CEO Variable Compensation 74.25% 73.46% 76.57% 75.15% 
 (22.07%) (22.71%) (20.02%) (21.14%) 
Outsiders/Total Directors 85.44% 86.26% 86.61% 85.49% 
 (7.77%) (6.60%) (5.95%) (8.13%) 
Ownership of Block-holders 17.31% 18.66% 14.67% 17.11% 
  (14.78%) (16.65%) (13.17%) (13.06%) 
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SECTION 4: EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
 This section starts with examining which firms choose to give. The section continues 
with investigating what determines if a firm establishes a corporate giving program vs. a 
company named foundation. Further, I look at what firm characteristics predict a firm 
establishing an endowment. Finally, the determinants of the giving amounts are examined.  
 Table 3 shows the characteristics of firms that predict if a firm chooses to give. Larger 
firms (determined by both logarithm of assets and employees) and more profitable firms (price-
to-book) are significantly more likely to give. Coefficients of all the governance characteristics 
are statistically and economically significant, indicating that firms with more inside directors, 
with CEOs whose salary is mainly comprised of variable compensation, and firms with more 
block-holders are all more likely to give.  
 This results stands in contract with some of the previous empirical literature that claimed 
that CEOs who are owners of a significant part of the company and firms with more block-
holders give less. The previous literature has not address a question of selection to give (i.e., 
selection bias). As the result, previous authors might have misinterpreted their results as 
indicative of giving levels, while if they have controlled for selection to give, their results and 
conclusions might have been different. In particular, the selection results indicate that firm with 
strong management are more likely to give. This does not imply that they give more (or less). It 
( 1R(
may be that these companies bank on being known as givers by establishing a giving or a 
foundation program. This result may be confirmed with examining if the companies with strong 
governance characteristics give more or less. This question will be examined in Table 6.  
 The comparison of the first and second column results in Table 3 shows another pattern 
worse noting. Most firm characteristics are insignificant, while all strong management 
characteristics are. The inclusion of strong management controls in column (2) makes the 
number of employees control, which was significant in column (1), insignificant. The result 
indicates strong interrelationship between strong management and the number of employees in 
the company controls. In layman’s language, the result may imply that firms with strong 
management would be more likely to have a giving program if a firm has more employees. The 
result may also imply that the employees are the main target group in firm’s conducting its 
charitable giving12.   
Table 3. Choice to Give  
The dependent variable equals 1 if the firm reports having a giving program or the charitable foundation, and 0 otherwise. Model: 
Probit. Coefficients are marginal effects and standard errors are hetroskedasticity corrected. *, **, *** z-statistic significant at the 
0.1, 0.05 or 0.01 levels, two-tailed test. Firm data and SIC codes are from Compustat. Board composition ad block-holdings are 
from proxy statements.(
 
((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
12 The next logical step would be to examine the interaction term between the number of employees and strong 
management characteristics, as well as to examine heterogeneity of firms with strong management. The results may 
be due to firms with strong management being homogeneous, e.g., coming from the same industry or from different 
industries but with consistently high number of employees.  
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  (1)   (2)  
Firm Characteristics     
Log(Assets) 0.04  0.04  
 (1.63) * (1.79) * 
Debt/Common Equity 0.01  0.01  
 (0.83)  (0.46)  
Ads/Sales 0.20  0.33  
 (0.4)  (0.76)  
R&D/Sales 0.07  0.12  
 (0.24)  (0.44)  
Price/Book 0.01  0.01  
 (0.8)  (1.04)  
Log(Employees) 0.03  0.02  
 (2.21) *** (1.18)  
Log(Company Age) 0.02  0.02  
 (1.35)  (1.35)  
Strong Management     
% CEO Variable Comp.   0.10  
   (1.68) * 
Inside/Total   0.35  
   (1.99) *** 
% Blockholders   0.22  
   (2.04) *** 
Industry Yes  Yes  
N13 345  331  
Pseudo-R2 0.15  0.24  
 
 Table 4 presents the results of a choice of a giving program. I present the results for two 
slightly different models. I have three distinct groups of firms: those that give through a giving 
((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((
13 The size of the sample is decreased from the original 460 due to some financial characteristics not being available 
for some companies. The original and the reduced samples are similar on all observable characteristics and thus 
there is no concern for the analyzed sample being unrepresentative.  
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program alone, through foundation alone, and through foundation and giving program 
simultaneously. The theoretical literature predicts firms that are strategic in their giving moving 
towards a in-house giving program to integrate giving with business objectives. The two models 
presented in Table 2 include first a group of firms that choose to use only an in-house giving 
program versus a foundation, and a second group of firms that choose to have both an in-house 
giving program and a foundation versus only a foundation.   
 The results in specifications (1) indicate that firms with significant advertising budget, as 
well as firms in service and retail industries are much more likely to give through an in-house 
giving program, while firms with more employees are much more likely to give through a 
foundation.  
Table 4. Choice of a Giving Program 
Coefficients are marginal effects, ***=z statistic significant at the 0.01 level, two-tailed test; **=z statistic significant at the 0.05 
level; *=z statistic significant at the 0.10 level. (
 (1)  (2)  
  Giving/F   F+G/F   
Firm Characteristics     
Log(Assets)  0.04  0.11  
 (1.03)  (2.32) *** 
Debt/Common Equity 0.00  -0.08  
 -(0.15)  -(1.90) ** 
Ads/Sales  3.69  1.23  
 (2.67) *** (1.05)  
R&D/Sales  -0.54  -0.46  
 -(0.89)  -(0.80)  
Price/Book -0.01  -0.01  
( /1(
 -(1.47)  -(0.58)  
Log(Employees)  -0.08  -0.01  
 -(2.19) *** -(0.20)  
Log(Company Age)  0.03  0.04  
 (0.86)  (1.53)  
Strong Management     
% CEO Variable Comp.  0.03  0.10  
 (0.22)  (0.61)  
Outsider/Total -0.34  0.12  
 -(0.74)  (0.24)  
% Blockholders -0.32  0.06  
 -(1.29)  (0.23)  
Industry     
  Mining* 0.36  -0.02  
 (1.16)  -(0.10)  
  Construction* -0.02    
 -(0.09)    
Transportation * 0.03  -0.14  
 (0.30)  -(1.44)  
  Wholesale* 0.00    
 (0.02)    
  Retail* 0.31  0.05  
 (3.77) *** (0.26)  
 Finance* 0.00  -0.18  
 -(0.01)  -(2.56) *** 
 Services* 0.32    
 (3.41) ***   
N 345   190   
Pseudo R2 0.074   0.1228   
 
. 
 Specification (2) examines whether firms that choose to have both a foundation and a 
giving program are different from those with only one program. The significant coefficient on 
( //(
debt to equity indicates that firms with more debt on their books are much less likely to have 
both programs. This result may indicate that firms that have a lot of oversight from the debt-
holders, maybe more conservative (less experimental) in their giving behavior and go with one 
program only. The firms in financial industry are much less likely to have two giving programs 
as well.  The insignificance of strong management coefficients in either specification (1) or (2) 
indicates that firms with strong management have no preference for a in-house giving program or 
a foundation, holding all the other control constant.  
 The results from Table 3 and 4 combined provide evidence that corporate charitable 
giving practice is non-random. Larger firms and firms with more employees tend to establish 
corporate charitable giving programs or foundations and tend to prefer foundations to in-house 
giving programs. Firms that are customer oriented prefer to set up in-house giving program. 
Strong management seem to be indifferent between the choice of a giving program until the 
program serves corporate needs.  
 Further I will explore in more details firms that choose to have a foundation or a 
foundation and an in-house giving program simultaneously. Table 5 presents results for a firm’s 
choice to establish an endowment. E8,(,&="7<,&:(%;(=,A%&,=(*;(*(A%#<M;(A"K&=*:%"&(8*?%&'(
*;;,:;(*;(C,*;:(:8#,,(:%<,;("A(:8,%#(*&&K*C('%?%&'D( As expected larger firms have an 
( /2(
endowment more frequently. Firms with more employees are much less likely to have an 
endowment.  
 
Table 5. Endowment Establishment 
Dependent variable is a binary, =1 when a firm’s foundation assets are at least three times that of the annual giving for the 
previous 6 years. Model: Probit. Coefficients are marginal effects and standard errors are hetroskedasticity corrected. ***, **, * 
are z-statistic significant at the 0.01, 0.05 or 0.1 levels, two-tailed test. Firm data and SIC codes are from Compustat. Board 
composition ad block-holdings are from proxy statements. (
 
  (1)  (2)   
Firm Characteristics      
    Log(Assets)  0.10  0.18  
 (2.13) *** (2.75) *** 
    Debt/Common Equity -0.04  -0.06  
 -(0.77)  -(1.22)  
    Ads/Sales  -2.91  -4.56  
 -(1.53)  -(2.18) *** 
    R&D/Sales  0.50  -0.05  
 (0.77)  -(0.07)  
    Price/Book 0.00  0.06  
 -(0.36)  (2.18) *** 
     Log(Employees)  -0.09  -0.10  
 -(2.09) *** -(1.85) *** 
    Log(Company Age)  0.02  0.01  
 (0.52)  (0.21)  
Strong Management     
   % CEO Variable Comp.  -0.32  -0.47  
 -(1.59)  -(2.12) *** 
    Outsider/Total -0.50  -0.02  
 -(0.78)  -(2.05) *** 
    % Blockholders 0.32  0.26  
 (1.01)  (0.36)  
Industries     
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    Construction   0.43  
   (1.18)  
    Manufacturing   0.26  
   (0.76)  
     Transportation   -0.25  
   -(1.02)  
     Wholesale   -0.25  
   -(0.99)  
     Retail   -0.24  
   -(0.96)  
    Finance   -0.40 *** 
   -(2.4)  
    Service   -0.38  
   -(1.98) *** 
 N 191   190   
Pseudo-R2 0.06   0.12   
 
are much more likely to have a foundation, but much less likely to establish an endowment, one 
possible explanation is that firms with more employees maybe much less strategic in their 
giving.  Firms in service sector as well as those that advertise a lot are not likely to have 
endowments. The result maybe due to selection bias: firms in service and retail industries as well 
as those that do a lot of advertising selecting give through a giving program mainly, as observed 
in Table 4. All strong management characteristics are statistically significant and indicate that 
firms with stronger management are much less likely to have endowments and for that reason 
strategic giving as defined by Porter & Kramer (2002).  
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Table 6 describes OLS regression results for the determinants of annual corporate giving. 
The regression is only for firms that have a foundation or a giving program and report a giving 
amount. Only 33% of firms with a giving program report their giving amount. Thus, the results 
will be biased towards explaining what determines giving amounts among firms with 
foundations.  
 
Table 6. Corporate Cash Giving 
Dependent Variable: Log of cash giving. Model: OLS. Robust standard errors, ***=t statistic significant at the 0.01 level, two-
tailed test; **=t statistic significant at the 0.05 level; *=t statistic significant at the 0.10 level. Dollar giving amounts as reported 
in Foundation Directory Online. Firm data is from Compustat. Board composition and blockholdings are from proxy statements. 
SIC codes are from Compustat.  
 
  (1)   (2)   
    Endowment (0 or 1)   -0.96  
   -(4.98) *** 
Firm Characteristics     
    Log(Assets)  0.14  0.17  
 (1.32)  (1.65) * 
    Debt/Common Equity -0.04  -0.04  
 -(0.41)  -(0.41)  
    Ads/Sales  11.11  9.87  
 (2.68) *** (2.42) *** 
    R&D/Sales  4.50  4.92  
 (1.41)  (1.65) * 
    Price/Book 0.01  0.03  
 (0.26)  (0.73)  
     Log(Employees)  -0.05  -0.12  
 -(0.53)  -(1.37)  
    Log(Company Age)  0.21  0.22  
 (2.18) *** (2.61) *** 
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Strong Management     
   % CEO Variable Comp.  0.13  -0.13  
 (0.25)  -(0.29)  
    Inside/Total 1.18  1.34  
 (0.75)  (0.91)  
    % Blockholders 0.14  0.41  
 (0.18)  (0.53)  
Industry Yes  Yes  
N 190   190   
R2-Adj. 0.24   0.34   
!
( The results in Table 6 indicate that older companies give more. Also, companies with 
more advertising and R&D expenditures give more. This latter result is similar to has been 
observed in Table 5: firms within high intensity advertising are likely to not establish 
foundations or endowments, but they are still much bigger givers.  
 In a specification (2) of Table 6 I also add a control of whether a firm has an endowment. 
The variable is statistically significant and indicates that firms with endowments give less. The 
more interesting result is that the inclusion of this variable into the regression significantly raises 
the explanatory power of the regression.  
 This section examines different hypothesis about strategic giving and finds that there is a 
systematic pattern in the current firms’ giving, but it hardly support the idea that giving is 
strategic in a sense described in Porter and Kramer (2002) article. 
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SECTION 5: DISCUSSIONS  
 The goal of this paper has been to identify different ways firms conduct corporate 
philanthropy, and to investigate what determines firms’ choice to give, to give through a giving 
program, to establish an endowment and to give more. These characteristics help shed light at 
which firms conduct corporate giving in a strategic way.  
 In the process of conducting empirical examinations, I find considerable diversity in the 
ways firms pursue philanthropy and little evidence that currently firms pursue philanthropy 
strategically as defined by Porter and Kramer (2002). I find that firms with strong management 
are much more likely to choose to give, but at the same time are much less likely to establish an 
endowment (e.g., set aside a significant amount of money for a long-term corporate philanthropy 
project) or to contribute a greater share of pre-tax earning than other firms. This result is 
consistent with previous literature that finds that firms engage in corporate giving to preempt the 
introduction of new government regulations; to avoid environmental scandals, consumer 
boycotts, or law suits; to increase their reputations in their communities and among various 
stakeholder groups (Friedman, 1985, 1999; Sharfman, 1994). To achieve those benefits, firms 
need to only be known to policymakers and stakeholder groups for being involved in 
philanthropy (e.g., a signaling leading to a separating equilibrium), but not necessarily spend 
( /R(
more or conduct any special strategic projects which are not likely to bring any additional 
financial or tangible benefits.    
  Another important observation is that firms in service and retail sectors as well as firms 
in high advertising intensity sectors are much more likely to employ a giving program for their 
corporate philanthropy and give significantly more. This result is consistent with previous 
empirical findings that corporations substitute corporate contributions for more traditional 
advertisements (Navarro, 1998). The question is if this giving is truly philanthropic or is aimed 
primarily on promoting public relations.  
  Finally, firms with a large number of employees are much more likely to give and to 
give through a foundation, while not necessarily establish an endowment. The result is consistent 
with intuition that firms do conduct charitable giving to increase their reputations within one of 
the most important stakeholder groups, e.g. employees (Sharfman, 1994).  
 Thus, the empirical findings support the notion that there is a great diversity of charitable 
practices among corporations. Corporations do choose a specific method of charitable giving to 
lure their most important stakeholder groups. This kind of charitable giving is strategic in a sense 
that firms maximize their return on dollar spend on charitable purposes. This result also reveals 
that, to be strategic, firms in different industries, with different stakeholder groups may need to 
employ different charitable practices that best fit a particular corporate profile.  
( /V(
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